acquisition. The benefit of obtaining the resource will be determined by the value of the resource itself (i.e. the left side of the equation). The cost of acquisition will be determined by the relative fighting ability between the two organisms and value to the competitor (i.e. the right side of the equation). The value of the resource to the organisms becomes relevant to the resolution of resource conflict because it corresponds to the fitness budget that an organism will be selected to spend to get the resource -for example, an organism will be selected to expend 5 reproductive units to get a resource worth 6 reproductive units, but not 7 to get that same resource. It is because of the differential fitness budget (i.e. v(X) / v(Y)) that less formidable animals are capable, at times, of getting resources valued by more formidable opponents.
Design of Animal Conflict and Selection Pressures in the Asymmetric War of Attrition
Five converging lines of evidence suggest that animals have been designed to adaptively respond to the selection pressures modeled in the Asymmetric War of Attrition:
1. Animals are designed such that relative Resource Holding Power partially determines the resolution of resource conflicts. Selection Pressure: more formidable organisms will expend their competitor's fitness budget faster than less formidable organisms, and thus will be more likely to gain contested resources.
The advantage in resource conflict given to more formidable competitors has been found in species as distantly related as the sea anemone (Brace & Pavey, 1978) , amphipods (Connell, 1963) , beetles (Eberhard, 1979) , African buffalo (Sinclair, 1977) , crayfish (Hazlett, Rubenstein & Ritschoff, 1975) , field crickets (Hofmann & Schildberger, 2001) , green sunfish (Hale, 1956 ), mice (Ginsberg & Allee, 1942) , golden hamsters (Marques & Valenstein, 1977) , and New Forest ponies (Tyler, 1972) . A particularly dramatic example was found by Petrie (1984) who studied territory size in the moorhen (Gallinula chloropus) and found that relative male weight was a RHP with reference to others (for a review of the non-primate animal literature see Huntingford and Turner, 1987 , for primate examples see Smuts et al., 1987) .
4.
Animals are designed to demonstrate RHP to lower the costs of contests. Selection Pressure: Both organisms engaged in a costly contest over a resource will minimize that cost if the eventual loser can recognize that it will lose.
If animal aggression over resources is designed to demonstrate relative RHP, the conflicts should follow a general pattern of escalation in which low cost demonstrations (which are probably less accurate) are exchanged before higher cost demonstrations or eventual nonritualistic, "no holds barred" combat. Large discrepancies in RHP should be evident even by comparatively inaccurate demonstrations of RHP. For example, tail beating in the cichlid fish (i.e. shaking one's tail at the opponent so that it makes waves that hit them) is an indicator of body size and strength that is presumed to be less predictive than mouth-locked wrestling (during which fish lock mouths and vigorously shake each other), but mouth-locked wrestling is more costly in terms of energy and probability of injury. This pattern of escalation, a model of which is called the sequential assessment game (Enquist & Leimar 1983) , has been observed in numerous and distally-related species including cichlid fish (Enquist et al., 1990) , bowl and doily spider (Austad, 1983) , African buffalo (Sinclair 1977) , beetles (Eberhard 1979) , common toads (Davies & Halliday 1978) , red deer (Clutton-Brock & Albon 1979) and pigs (Jensen, P. & Yngvesson, 1998 and has been demonstrated in many social species such as hens (Maier, 1964) , dark-eyed juncos (Cristol, 1992) , Panamanisan insects (i.e. Zorotypus gurneyi, Chloe, 1994), chickens (Guhl, 1956 ), dark chub fish (Katano, 1990) , hyenas (Owens & Owens, 1996) , cockroaches (Ewing, 1967) , and every social monkey and ape (Smuts et al. 1987) . While dominance hierarchies are talked about as if they were features of a community it is important to remember that the information is stored within the individual brains of the organisms and reflects a cognitive structure in the animals that stores one's relative position to one's conspecifics.
Humans: Constructing a Cognitive Model of Human Anger
Human resource competition often looks different from non-human animal resource competition, due in large part to our ability to have metarepresented conflicts of interests, e.g. a dung fly can fight over a piece of food but a human can fight over whether someone should have gotten a piece of food, or even if someone should have agreed with someone else who wanted to give a piece of food to a third party, etc. Though humans face conflicts of interest over morsels of food, the majority of resource conflicts between humans do not involve tangible, materiallyrepresented resources, but instead involve conflicts over courses of action (retrospective and prospective), exchanges of information, social alliances, and other abstract cost-benefit tradeoffs between the welfare of two individuals. Such tradeoffs fit the mathematical definition of resource competition; and thus would be subject to the same selection pressures as the hypothetical morsel of food in the traditional AWA equation. An analysis of the selection pressures inherent in resource conflict argues for the existence of an internal variable, similar to that which underlies dominance hierarchies in non-human animals, that regulates decisions about cost-benefit interactions in humans. This has been called a Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (Sell, 2006; Tooby et al. 2008) .
Welfare Tradeoff Ratios (WTRs)
It is posited that humans internally represent a threshold for acceptable cost-benefit transactions called a Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (i.e. for agent X, the value (v(X)/v(Y)) that indicates the cost-benefit transaction, below which Y will get the resource and above which X will get the resource. An individual will have different Welfare Tradeoff Ratios for different individuals. For example, a person might be willing to ruin a stranger's favorite sweater to dress their pet's wound, but unwilling to ruin the Dean's sweater for a similar reason. This ratio can be seen as a threshold (the dotted line in Figure 1 ), above which agent X would relinquish the benefit rather than impose the cost on Y. This ratio is X's Welfare Tradeoff Ratio with respect to Y-as it indicates the extent to which X is willing to tradeoff his own welfare in order to raise Y's and vice versa. The numbered circles can be thought of as cost-benefit transactions of different values for X and Y. The size of the circle indicates the relative value of the resource, with larger circles indicating proportionally higher value for X. So, for example, conflict 1 could be X ruining Y's car to avoid paying a speeding ticket, while 5 could be X making Y wait in line while X called the hospital to check on a loved one.
Given mutual human dependence, the costs of contests, and the nature of kin and friendship, natural selection is predicted to have designed humans such that Welfare Tradeoff Ratios will be set higher based on numerous factors related to another's ability to enforce their own welfare. One set of factors is related to the ability to enforce WTRs by threatening to inflict harm: these include, e.g., greater physical strength and more coalitional support. Welfare Tradeoff Ratios set primarily by the threat of force will be consulted, presumably, only when there is some possibility that the individual will be present to defend his or her interests. This is entirely analogous to the relative formidability (RHP) that is known to affect resource division in non-human animals. Another set of factors that set WTRs is related to the ability to defend one's welfare by threatening to withdraw the benefits of cooperation: these include, e.g., the person's status as a frequent and dependable reciprocation partner, their status as a friend who has a stake in your welfare (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996) , or their possession of special abilities that can be deployed to benefit others. Another factor, independent of the ability to enforce higher welfare trade-off ratios, is kinship: the welfare of one's children and kin should be valued more highly than that of nonkin, in ways that satisfy Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964) .
It is likely that there are at least two types of Welfare Tradeoff Ratios that govern costbenefit transactions in different contexts: 1) monitored Welfare Tradeoff Ratios -which define the threshold of cost-benefit transactions when both parties are present or otherwise capable of defending their interests, and 2) intrinsic Welfare Tradeoff Ratios -which define the threshold of cost-benefit transactions when the other individual is not present or unable to defend their interests. Intrinsic WTRs allowed individuals to adaptively partition cost-benefit transactions in a world where the welfare of other individuals was of adaptive significance for oneself. 2 
The Recalibrational Theory of Anger: Human Anger is an Adaptation to Raise Another's Welfare Tradeoff Ratio with Respect to Oneself
It is proposed herein that a large and well bounded subset of phenomena that people refer to when they use the word "anger" can be understood as the output of a highly-sophisticated, complex, reliably-developing computational system, instantiated in neural tissue and designed by natural selection, that is deployed as a negotiative tool to resolve conflicts of interest in the present or future in the angered individual's favor. The anger system does this by initiating behaviors that (1) recalibrate the target's estimates of the costs and benefits of actions to the target and to the angered individual, and (2) raise the target's Welfare Tradeoff Ratio toward the angered individual, so the target takes that individual's welfare more into account in the present and/or future. Two main negotiative actions deployed to recalibrate the target's Welfare Tradeoff Ratio are (1) threatening to inflict costs (or actually doing so) and (2) threatening to withdraw cooperation (or actually doing so).
Causes of Human Anger
Anger should be triggered when one individual interprets the actions of the target as indicating that the target's WTR toward the individual is lower than the accepted level. Welfare Tradeoff Ratios are theorized to be used when making cost-benefit decisions, indeed that is their hypothesized function, but they may also be used by other cognitive programs such as memory storage for individuals (e.g. we may remember our nieces birthday but not our mailman's), frequency of consideration (e.g. one thinks daily about a spouse but may forget about old friends for weeks at a time), inherent pleasure in being around an individual, the weight placed on the veracity of another's beliefs, one's willingness to seek advice or share secrets, vicarious WTR toward friends of friends, etc. As a result of the mass utility of WTRs, there is predicted to be a plethora of computationally distinct ways of triggering anger, each with its own blend of behavioral responses dependant upon how the WTR was indicated (see below for examples).
The most theoretically clear indication of a low WTR is the target's willingness to take actions that impose a large cost on the angry individual in order for the target to receive a small benefit. Holding other variables constant, anger will be more likely to be activated over a costbenefit transaction as i) the cost imposed on the individual increases, ii) the benefit reaped as a result of that cost decreases, and iii) characteristics of the instigator, the angry individual and their relationship indicate that it is possible for the angry individual to force the other to use a higher WTR than was indicated by the cost-benefit transaction imposed.
Computational Processes Executed by Anger
Just as animals are designed to minimize the cost of violent confrontations that can be avoided by communication regarding relative resource value and relative RHP, so should human anger be designed to minimize the costs of anger that are triggered by misperceived costs and benefits on behalf of both the angry individual and the target of anger.
When evidence clearly exists that the instigator perceived the cost to be large and the benefit to be small and enacted the transactions with such knowledge (i.e. intentionally), then anger should trigger behavior that is designed to increase the WTR in the target such that they will be less likely to impose cost-benefit transactions of that ratio (or worse) again.
On the other hand, when evidence exists that the target perceived a cost or benefit differently than the angry individual, the anger system should be designed to modify the target's perception of that variable in ways that prevent this particular transaction (and a subset of other transactions involving the same misconstrued variable) from being enacted.
Behavioral Responses Generated by Anger
The primary functions of anger are to raise the magnitude of the WTR of an individual who has demonstrated a lower WTR than is acceptable to the angry individual, and/or to recalibrate that individual's estimates of the magnitude of the costs imposed and benefits received. Welfare Tradeoff Ratios in the target should be open to modification when this will allow the target to avoid being harmed or having cooperation withdrawn-more precisely, in circumstances that predicted, ancestrally, that these two negative outcomes were likely.
Thus, when the anger system is triggered by evidence that the target's WTR toward oneself is too low, it should motivate the angered individual to make credible threats, or demonstrate qualities that would make such threats credible, if made. WTRs are hypothesized to be set, partly, by relative formidability, just as it is with many other animals. Thus if an individual is showing evidence of a low WTR, it could be the result of an underestimation of one's willingness or ability to use force and could be recalibrated by a cost-effective demonstration of said force. As with non-human animals, formidability should be demonstrated starting with low-cost, presumably less accurate, demonstrations of physical strength and escalate as needed to more accurate and dangerous demonstrations of strength. Evidence reviewed below reveals that this is the case.
The theory also predicts that anger should be designed to manipulate the other individual's estimates of the magnitude of costs and benefits inherent in the transaction. To the extent that you can increase another's perception of a cost he or she imposed on you, you can decrease the probability that the individual will impose such a cost on you again. The same is true of reducing another's perception of the benefit they received.
Known Features of Anger
Given the breadth of data collected on human anger, the first step when proposing a new theory must be to determine its consistency with empirical findings that have been shown to be both large in effect and robust across studies. It should be noted that while I did my best to choose the datasets below based on their effect sizes, reliability and cross-cultural documentation it is not a complete review of the anger literature. (Taylor, 1967) , seriousness of a crime (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980; Hamilton & Rytina, 1980; Warr, Gibbs, & Erickson, 1982; White, 1975) , and monetary payoffs in economic games (Fehr & Gaechter, 2000) .
Feature #2: Intentionality Increases the Likelihood of Anger
When a cost is imposed, but without prior knowledge on behalf of the imposer, there is much less anger and retaliation than if the cost was knowingly imposed (see Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Ohbuchi and Kambara, 1985; Nickel, 1974) . Theories that posit intentionality have used different definitions. For example, Heider (1958) defined intention as a plan that guides action, Kaufmann (1970) defined an aggressive action as one which is known by the actor to have a non-zero chance of inflicting harm on the target, and Tedeschi and Felson (1994) defined an intentional action as, "an act performed with the expectation that it will produce a proximate outcome of value to the actor." (pg. 164). Intentionality, being an unobservable feature of human social life, must be a category the human mind uses to classify types of actions, and thus must be discovered and explored rather than defined as a given feature of the world. A fully described theory of intentionality will have to answer, at a minimum, what information must be known for something to qualify as intentional. For example, if someone plans to hit you with a toy ball and expects that you will enjoy this as part of a game, but when you are hit you become very upset because you didn't want to play, would the person's act have been intentional? Heider's definition cannot answer this. Kaufmann's definition would imply that it is not intentional. Tedeschi and Felson's would say it was.
Feature #3: Apologies Mitigate Anger
The most reliable way to reduce anger yet found in the empirical literature is to apologize (Frantz & Benningson 2005; Goffman 1971; Harrell, 1980; Harrell & Hartnagel 1979; Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie 1989; Riordan, Marlin & Kellogg 1983; Schlenker 1980; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph & Tedeschi 1978; Zechmeister, et al. 2004 ). The content of apologies varies, and a great deal of empirical work remains to be done on distinguishing "real" from "false" apologies, and why angry individuals are so sensitive to the difference (see Holtgraves, 1989) .
Feature #4: Anger and Aggression are Often Used by Males to Restore "Face"
Violent and homicidal aggression are most common among young men everywhere and across all known time periods (Daly & Wilson 1988) . These fights are largely the result of insults and attempts to save "face" or attain status by fighting. This account of violent aggression among males has been shown, to some extent independently, by criminologists (Luckenbill 1977; Wolfgang 1958) , sociologists (Williams 1980) , social psychologists (Berg and Fox, 1947; Felson 1982; Nisbett & Cohen 1996) (Lewis, 1961) , the Montenegrins of Eastern Europe (Boehm 1984), Inuit/Eskimos (Balikci 1970) , the Jivaro Indians of the western Amazon (Karsten 1935) and American gangs (Toch 1969) . In each of those societies, threats to one's "face" or "status" were often the beginnings of a violent episode between young men.
Feature #5: Personal Insults are One of the Most Reliable Causes of Anger
Though not usually the object of study, personal insults have been used in aggression research for forty years and have (in most cases) been shown to be sufficient causes of anger (Geen, 1968; Worchel, Arnold & Harrison, 1978) . More ecologically valid examples of aggression have found that personal "insults" almost always precede homicides (Berg and Fox, 1947; Toch, 1969; Luckenbill, 1977; Daly & Wilson, 1988) and assaults (Felson, 1982; Felson, Baccaglini, & Gmelch 1986 ).
Feature #6: Anger Results in an Exchange of Arguments
The most common response to an anger-inducing event in naturally-occurring situations is to engage in an argument. James Averill established this in the early 1980s with an influential study of a large sample of adults (1982, 1983) .
Feature #7: Anger has Cross-Culturally Universal Features and Neuro-Physiological Locality
The anger expression has been found to be universal across individuals and cultures, including cultures with no historical Western contact (Ekman 1973 , Brown 1991 . It has been demonstrated in six-month old infants (Stenberg, Campos & Emde, 1983; Stenberg & Campos, 1990 ) and in congenitally blind children (Galati et al. 2003) .
Physiological changes as a result of anger have been found to be similar across cultures tested (Rime & Giovannini 1986 ): Subjects across a broad European sample reported that anger felt unpleasant, warm, and frequently led to muscular tension. These patterns of responses were dissociable from other emotions in all cultures.
Behavioral responses that result from anger have been shown to be similar across European countries. Specifically, anger often led to vocal changes involving increased volume and sometimes trembling, changes in movement quality, clenched fists and increased hand movement (Shaver et al. 1987; Wallbot, Ricci-Bitti & Baenninger-Huber 1986) . Furthermore, Klaus Scherer and colleagues have categorized vocal transmissions of emotion and showed that when angry, fundamental frequency (roughly, pitch) often increases in mean and variability (Banse & Scherer 1996; Johnstone & Scherer 2000) . This pattern is also distinct from other emotions.
The antecedents of anger have also been shown to be cross-culturally similar. Recall the cross-cultural data on aggression being driven by insults to one's "face" reviewed in feature #4. Wallbott and Scherer (1986) further demonstrated similar antecedents of anger for a broad range of European countries.
Finally, there have been numerous studies isolating parts of the brain that are differentially activated by anger, demonstrating that its neural-circuitry develops in similar ways across individuals and across species and is distinct from other emotions. Anger has been known to rely on the amygdala since at least the 1960s (see King, 1961) . More recently Panksepp (2000) theorized, based on brain imaging and lesion studies, that anger relies mostly on the medial amygdale, bed nucleus of strai terminalis (BNST), and the medial and perifornical hypothalamus.
The anger/rage system is moderated primarily by acetylcholine and glutamate in ways that connect the amygdale and periaqueductal gray (PAG) with the hypothalamus (see Siegel & Schubert 1995) . Finally a recent meta-analysis has also confirmed that testosterone tracks individual differences in tendencies toward anger and aggression with a correlation of approximately .20 (Archer 1998; see also Dabbs & Dabbs 2000) .
How does the Recalibrational Theory Account for Features of Anger? Feature #1: Cost Imposition
The Recalibrational Theory predicts that the cause of anger is not negative affect directly, but the indication that another holds a low Welfare Tradeoff Ratio with respect to you. A common indication of such a WTR is the imposition of a cost that is too large given the benefit the offender received. Holding the magnitude of the benefit received constant, the larger the cost one is willing to impose, the more likely anger is to be triggered. Likewise, holding the cost constant the more the other individual benefits by imposing that cost the less angry one is to be (Sell 2006) .
Feature #2: Intentionality
Intentionality, in the context of anger, can be thought of as the output of a cognitive mechanism that determines whether a WTR was engaged when a cost was imposed. This predicts that anger-based intentionality requires knowledge of: the magnitude of the imposed cost, the magnitude of the benefit received, and the identity of the individual on whom the cost was imposed. Each of these three components has been shown to affect anger in the predicted direction (Sell 2006) .
Feature #3: Apologies
The Recalibrational Theory suggests that apologies are explicit acknowledgements of either: 1) a past discrepant WTR that has been corrected or 2) misperceptions of costs and benefits. The content of WTR-recalibrated apologies (type 1) are predicted to contain statements that translate into the following cognitive grammar, "I will demonstrate a more favorable Welfare Tradeoff Ratio with respect to you, such that I will no longer impose costs of that magnitude on you for benefits of that magnitude." This may be best proved by restitution or by indicating a willingness to incur a cost to repay the angry individual. The content of type 2 apologies should contain statements about the magnitude of perceived costs and benefits such as, "I didn't realize that would hurt you so badly; I thought I had a good reason for doing that but I was wrong" etc.
Feature #4: The role of "face" and "status"
Perceptions of formidability play a part in the setting of Welfare Tradeoff Ratios, particularly for males. As such, the Recalibrational Theory predicts that demonstrations of physical strength in humans should involve the same procedures as strength contests in nonhuman animals, such as: signals of challenge, escalating conflicts that start with low-violent demonstrations (e.g. pushing contests, staring contests, etc.) and escalate to more violent demonstrations (e.g. wrestling, punching, weaponry), and signals of surrender that cease violence.
These patterns fit the data on homicide quite well (Luckenbill 1977) .
Feature #5: Insults
The Recalibrational Theory predicts that anger-inducing insults can be understood as attempts to directly indicate a low Welfare Tradeoff Ratio with respect to another individual, and, perhaps, as attempts to influence others to hold lower WTRs with respect to the insulted individuals. Insults should, psychologically, translate to the form, "I do not value your interests highly." More proximately, insults can be declarations of a deficit in a variable that is used to determine one's WTR toward that individual. One such variable, for males at least, is physical strength. Fitting with this theory, insults toward males have been shown to frequently target a man's strength -e.g. wimp, wuss, geek, nerd, bitch, girly-man, pussy, weakling (Harris 1993; Preston & Kimerley 1987) . Though beyond the scope of this analysis, it seems likely that other insults fit into categories that make a man socially powerful or not, such as his intent to cooperate (e.g. asshole, prick, bastard [colloquial meaning], etc.), his being unable/unwilling to function as a reliable cooperator or being otherwise unworthy of having others take his interests into account (e.g. punk, white trash, ghetto trash, bum, etc.), or his competence (e.g. idiot, fool, loser).
Feature #6: Arguments
The Recalibrational Theory predicts two primary functions of arguments: i) recalibrate the target's WTR, raising it so the target's decisions will take the angered person's welfare more into account, and ii) recalibrate the target's perception of the costs and benefits imposed. When WTRs are largely based on relative fighting ability one would predict arguments about aggressive potential, i.e. "I could kick your ass" or "my dad could beat up your dad!" When one has an expectation of inherent value (such as with friends, kin, and others with whom long-term cooperation would be mutually beneficial) one would predict statements of relative friendship quality would be used to boost another's intrinsic WTR toward oneself. For example, "I wouldn't do that to you" or "remember when your mother was sick and I took notes for you in all your classes." Secondary functions most likely include: a) Gathering information about the magnitudes of the values involved in the cost-benefit exchange (e.g. Why did you do that?), the offender's knowledge of the magnitude of the cost, benefit, and victim identity (e.g. "Do you know how much that hurt?, "Do you know who you're messing with?"), the offender's perception of their WTR with respect to you ("I thought we were friends?"), and other variables that are used to set WTRs. b). Testing the boundaries of one's WTR with respect to the other and vice versa (e.g. verbal bullying).
Feature #7: Universality
In contrast to other theories, the Recalibrational Theory clearly predicts that anger is an adaptation designed by natural selection and that its basic computational structure should be universal across cultures and should share a phylogenetic relationship with closely related nonhuman animals resulting in similarly localized brain areas. Furthermore, like non-human animals, humans should have signals of aggressive intent based on enhanced features of formidability (e.g. facial and vocal expressions), physiological preparedness for aggression if necessary, and a structured functional set of causes and behavioral responses that are similar across cultures.
Conclusion: How to Account for Complex Design
Social science has had difficulty accounting for complex features of human behavior largely because it has ignored the one known cause of complex functional design in organisms:
natural selection (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) . Without functional theories capable of generating testable predictions about many different aspects of the domain of study, researchers have had two choices: 1) retreat into smaller data sets that can be predicted and cogently summarized by one or two main effects, or 2) posit intuitive concepts to account for a great range of data but remain computationally intractable and pliable enough to account for shifting datasets.
The alternative to computationally vague theories, or theories that are specific but restricted to smaller data sets, are computationally-specific, functional theories that posit many testable hypotheses based on a simple model of selection pressures and the logical extensions of them given what is known of human evolutionary history and the design of other animals.
Natural selection is the only process shown capable of organizing and designing organisms. It is the only process that could have designed anger, 3 and thus any functional design in the system (including the reliably developing facial expressions, vocalizations, physiological changes, recalibrational learning mechanisms, and behavioral responses) can only be explained by computational designs that could have solved the selection pressures that created anger. The selection pressures described in this paper may or may not be the ones most responsible for the functional structure of human anger, though they have had great early success in making predictions and explaining many of the most reliable and significant features of anger. Ultimately, the Recalibrational Theory will be judged by its ability to generate computationally-specific explanations capable of organizing and explaining features of anger that have been intractable by the intuitive nature of other theories and its ability to make novel predictions that lead to large, reliable effects. If it fails, the alternative must be another computationally-specific, functional theory that is consistent with evolutionary biology. The dataset on anger is now too large to be described by simple learning mechanisms and too detailed to be accounted for by theories that do not computationally specify their primary components. 
